Tag: antitrust

  • Bill Gates’s monopolistic mask-off moment

    Bill Gates’s monopolistic mask-off moment

    Originally published at pluralistic.net

    Cory Doctorow

    Don’t let the sweater-vests and the (dilettantish) “education reform” work fool you: Bill Gates made his fortune through sheer robber-baronry, presiding over a vicious monopolist that shattered the law in its greedy quest for billions and permanent, global dominance.

    Microsoft’s illegal conduct was so blatant, persistent and obviously wicked that it prompted serious enforcement action from the DoJ’s antitrust division, which Reagan neutered and which every president since has whittled down even further.

    The most notorious moment in that last-of-its-kind enforcement action was the multi-day, video-recorded deposition of Bill Gates himself, in which he conducted himself so badly that the video went analog-viral, airing on newscasts and being passed hand-to-hand on VHS.

    Today on Ars Technica, Dan Goodin revisits that momentous week in 1998 when Gates covered himself in everlasting shame and gave us a peek behind the curtain at the private persona of a swaggering monopolist.

    https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/09/revisiting-the-spectacular-failure-that-was-the-bill-gates-deposition/

    Goodin’s piece was occasioned by Microsoft’s intervention in the Epic-v-Apple affair, in which a Microsoft exec decried Apple’s abuse of its “complete monopoly over the distribution of apps … to coerce app developers into using Apple’s payment platform.”

    Gates’s deposition is a reminder of how far Microsoft’s position changed between 1998 and now. As Goodin writes, Gates’s plan for the deposition was to obstruct, paint the DoJ as technically incompetent, and to “deny even the most basic of premises in the government’s case.”

    This was a brutally stupid plan. It failed so badly. Government lawyer would ask Gates questions like “What non-Microsoft browsers were you concerned about in January of 1996” and Gates would claim not to know what “concerned” means.

    It was the Fat Tony defense: “What’s a truck? What’s a murder?”

    It was so stupid and blatant that people in the gallery started laughing aloud at Gates’s obstruction (after all, part of his defense was that he was a genius whose mind could not be understood by mere govvies).

    The deposition really revealed Gates’s expectation that he would be deferred to and even worshipped in the manner that his absolute authoritarian rule over Microsoft had accustomed him to.

    As Ken Auletta noted, Gates had never had to sit for a job interview or suffer other routine indignities.

    Goodin: “he had little or no experience tolerating—let alone encountering—dissent, criticism, or challenges to his authority.”

    But even with a better strategy, Gates would have still been in trouble, because he put a bewildering array of radioactively illegal conduct in writing, and the DoJ had it all in black and white:

    • A conspiracy to force Intuit to bundle Internet Explorer and break compatibility with Netscape

    • A conspiracy to modify Windows so Netscape-rendered content would appear “degraded”

    • A conspiracy to make an incompatible version of Java that only ran on Windows, with the goal of “wresting control of Java away from Sun”

    • A conspiracy to get Apple to break compatibility with Netscape, tying Microsoft Office improvement to Apple’s sabotage of Netscape

    With all this evidence, the fact that Microsoft escaped serious sanction tells you just how degraded antitrust law has become (it’s gotten weaker and worse since). But just as telling is the impact that antitrust enforcement had on Microsoft’s conduct.

    It’s undeniable that the reason web companies like Google survived the 2010s is that Microsoft had lost its nerve, after years of traumatic DoJ investigation and litigation.

    Gates admitted this last year, saying the reason Microsoft didn’t bid for Android was they were “distracted” by the antitrust action:

    https://pluralistic.net/2020/05/16/labor-investors/#big-goog

    But that action had ended years before Android. When Gates says he was “distracted,” he means he was terrified.

    And as Tim Wu pointed out, it probably made them a better company. Monoplism makes companies act like mafias, stupid and lazy, with an emphasis on abusive commercial practice rather than technical or organizational excellence.

    When AT&T; was broken up in 82, corporatists cried that America was sacrificing its “national champion” just as Japan was eroding America’s technical dominance, and without AT&T;’s monopoly power, America’s tech industry was done.

    Instead, breaking up AT&T; opened the space for the entire internet, and a generation-long American dominance of a system that has become a planetary nervous system, a source of prolonged American dominance and trillions in GDP.

    In other words: Fat Tony is a shitty businessman.

    People express dismay at that 2016 photo of Trump with tech’s leaders around a Trump Tower boardroom table, aghast that these people who run our tech world were willing to meet with a racist bully.

    https://techcrunch.com/2016/12/14/donald-trump-meets-with-tech-leaders/

    Fair enough.

    But even more alarming is something rarely commented upon:

    The entire tech industry fits around a single table.

    That should make you furious and terrified – and glad that we are finally seeing a stirring of America’s old trustbusting traditions.

    Reagan may have maimed antitrust.

    Bush I, Clinton, GWB, Obama and Trump may have brutalized it.

    But it is not dead. And it’s slowly, relentlessly, getting back on its feet.

  • End of the line for Reaganomics

    End of the line for Reaganomics

    Originally published at pluralistic.net

    Cory Doctorow

    Reagan turned the country upside-down, in a very bad way. The “Reagan revolution” was indeed revolutionary (or, rather, counter-revolutionary), reversing a half-century of progress on social safety nets, workers’ rights, and environmental protections.

    When we take stock of the Reagan years, we tend to focus on the actions that had immediate effect, like dismantling labor protections or the racist, homophobic refusal to confront the AIDS pandemic.

    But for my money, the most profound act of the Reagan revolution was a slow-burner that has quietly chugged along for four decades, profoundly reshaping American society and the world. It’s a wonky, technical change, largely overlooked in our political discourse.

    That change? The “consumer welfare” theory of antitrust enforcement.

    Prior to Reagan, US antitrust enforcers relied upon a theory of “harmful dominance,” cracking down on monopolies when their scale allowed them to hurt workers, or the environment, or suppliers.

    Harmful dominance is the theory that unaccountable power is dangerous – that giving corporate leaders control over the market lets them pervert the political process and inflict harms on the rest of us in ways that are hard to detect and even harder to prevent.

    That principle created a policy that was designed to keep companies weaker than the democratically accountable state, rather than allowing them to grow so large that the could capture their regulators and start to write their own regulations.

    Reagan nuked “harmful dominance,” replacing it with radical theories from one of Nixon’s top crooks, Robert Bork, whose book THE ANTITRUST PARADOX advances a conspiracy theory about US antitrust – that the framers of these laws never meant to protect us from monopoly at all.

    Bork said that a the true purpose of antitrust law was – and always had been – “consumer welfare.” He said that so long as a monopoly didn’t use its market power to raise prices, that was fine -even if its scale let it screw workers, or suppliers, or whole communities.

    This was a profound shift, because under “consumer welfare,” companies were allowed to grow big through sleazy, previously prohibited maneuvers like buying up or merging with all the competition, or creating vertical systems that boxed in their customers from all sides.

    “Consumer welfare” had deep-pocketed corporate backers, who spread Bork’s conspiracy theory far and wide. For example, the Manne Seminars – summer “continuing education” junkets in Florida for judges – re-reeducated 40% of the US federal bench on Bork’s theories.

    These seminars, along with decades of dark-money endowed economics chairs and think-tank activism changed the theory of competition regulation around the world – even in the EU, where the law explicitly rejects consumer welfareism, but lawmakers behave as if it embraced it.

    Consumer welfare was bipartisan, embraced by every administration, R or D, since Reagan (in general Dems became more Reaganite over this period, culminating at the 2016 DNC where candidates vied to declare themselves Reagan’s true heir).

    https://crookedtimber.org/2016/07/30/philadelphia-stories-from-reagan-to-trump-to-the-dnc/

    The result: a world where between 1-5 companies dominate nearly every industry, from pharma to eyeglasses, finance to accounting, shipping to hotels, health to mobile OSes – movies, music, books, telecoms, hospitals, pro wrestling, and on and on.

    https://www.openmarketsinstitute.org/learn/monopoly-by-the-numbers

    These companies don’t need to compete for workers or customers, and therefore extract vast sums for their shareholders. Some of that money is retained to buy off their regulators, allowing them to grow more powerful still.

    Not only that, but these concentrated companies are able to arrive at a common bargaining position and wield it against the world’s democratic legislatures – when everyone who runs an industry can fit around a single table and hammer out an agreement, they often do.

    Most of this happened so slowly that we didn’t realize it was happening at all, but not with tech. Tech is an industry that grew up with Reagan (literally, the Apple ][+ was born the same year as the Reagan presidential bid), and it was monopoly’s coalmine canary.

    In a single generation, tech’s exuberant dynamism – where yesterday’s giants could be toppled by today’s spunky garage startups – turned into a calcified monoculture, “five giant websites filled with screenshots of text from the other four.”

    https://twitter.com/tveastman/status/1069674780826071040

    After 40 years of dominance, consumer welfare is dying. Biden’s July 9 “Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy” is a terrifyingly technical, 72-point program for dismantling consumer welfare and reviving harmful dominance.

    https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/

    The Biden admin clearly consulted with public interest groups for these technical directives, people who are right at the coalface of the way that monopolies are destroying lives, who know exactly which levers to pull to shut it down.

    This is especially true in tech, as I write in my latest piece for EFF’s Deeplinks blog: “Party Like It’s 1979: The OG Antitrust Is Back, Baby!”

    https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/party-its-1979-og-antitrust-back-baby

    And because personnel are policy, I also discuss the revolution in anttitrust leadship that accompanied the executive order: Lina Khan running the FTC, Tim Wu in charge of White House tech competition, and Jonathan Kanter running antitrust for the DoJ.

    “We are living through a profound shift in what kinds of companies are allowed to exist and what they’re allowed to do. It’s a shift for the better. We know nothing is assured. The future won’t fix itself. But this is an opportunity, and we’re delighted to seize it.”

  • Cochrane, ‘What’s Love Got to Do with It? Diamonds and the Accumulation of De Beers, 1935-55’

    Cochrane, ‘What’s Love Got to Do with It? Diamonds and the Accumulation of De Beers, 1935-55’

    Abstract

    What is accumulation? Visibly, accumulation is a quantitative process, demarcated in financial quantities. However, what is the meaning of those quantities? This question has been the subject of great debate within political economic thought. A new theory of accumulation, capital as power (CasP), argues that the financial quantities of accumulation express the distribution of power among the owners of capital over the qualitatively diverse, complex and mutating social order. With this dissertation, I explore the relationship between the quantities and qualities of accumulation by examining the De Beers diamond cartel, focusing on the period 1935-55. What does it mean to say ‘capital is power’ in the specific setting of the global diamond assemblage? Research and analysis led me to focus on four important relationships that De Beers had to establish, maintain and transform in its struggle for differential accumulation: with diamonds themselves; with potential and actual diamond buyers; with governments; and, with families, especially the Oppenheimer family that controlled De Beers for over 80 years.

    Citation

    What’s Love Got to Do with It? Diamonds and the Accumulation of De Beers, 1935-55

    Cochrane, DT. (2015). Unpublished PhD Dissertation. Program in Social and Political Thought. York University.